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Abstract. Since the 1990s, two technologies have reshaped how we see
and experience the world around us. These technologies are the Internet
and mobile communication, especially smartphones. The Internet pro-
vides a cheap and convenient way to explore and communicate with dis-
tant people. A multitude of services have converged on the smartphone
platform, and potentially the most notable is social networking. With
increased interconnectivity and use of online services, concerns about
consumers' security and privacy are growing. In this paper, we evaluate
the security- and privacy-preserving features provided by existing mo-
bile chat services. This paper also puts forwards a basic framework for
an End-to-End (E2E) security and privacy-preserving mobile chat service
and associated requirements. We implemented the proposal to provide
proof-of-concept and evaluate the technical diﬃculty of satisfying the
stipulated security and privacy requirements.
1 Introduction
The instant messaging services provided by applications like WhatsApp, Apple
iMessage and BlackBerry Messenger are overtaking traditional SMS services [1],
becoming the preferred medium of communication for millions of smartphone
users1. However, the security and privacy-preserving features of diﬀerent mobile
applications have come under the spot-light [3]. There are diﬀerent security and
privacy features provided by diﬀerent mobile chat applications, but there are not
many mobile chat applications that provide an End-to-End (E2E) security and
privacy-preserving service to their customers.
In this paper, we focus on such a mobile chat service. We propose a framework
for building such a service and then evaluate the technical challenges involved
in implementing it, to provide a proof-of-concept and understand any potential
technical issues which may restrict such features from being implemented by
mainstream mobile chat service providers.
1 Financial Times report [1] put the number of daily instant messages at 41billion and
WhatsApp has more than 200 million active monthly users [2].
1.1 Contributions of the Paper
This paper deals with the security and privacy-related challenges faced in the
design, development and maintenance of a mobile chat service. The main con-
tributions of this study are:
1. End-to-End (E2E) security and privacy-preserving architecture for mobile
chat services
2. Secure key exchange, even when communicating parties are not online (i.e.
for oine messages)
3. User-to-User (U2U) authentication mechanism2
4. Implementation analysis of proposed architecture
1.2 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 discusses the evolution of mobile phone technology and how mobile
chat is becoming a convenient method of communication. In section 3, we ex-
plore the existing commercial applications that provide diﬀerent degrees of se-
curity and privacy features. In addition, we also stipulate the security and pri-
vacy requirements for an E2E secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat service.
Subsequently, we describe the proposed framework along with the details of cru-
cial operations. In section 4, practical implementation experience is presented.
Section 5 provides an overall analysis of the proposed/implemented framework.
Finally in section 6 we provide potential future research directions and conclude
the paper.
2 Mobile Phones
In this section, we brieﬂy visit smartphone technology in order to understand the
scale of the market, which directly relates to the security and privacy concerns
of mobile chat users.
2.1 Smartphones: A Paradigm Shift
The mobile phone platform has evolved a long way from the original simple
medium of voice and text communication to become the hub of the digital world.
Mobile phones, along with being an entertainment hub, have also developed into
a social construct that has aﬃliations and emotional attachments for individuals.
It is also becoming the predominant medium for connecting with the world
through social media sites/applications [4,5].
The so-called App Culture promoted by Apple Inc. [6,7], has enabled users
to seamlessly download any application they desire. This has opened the smart-
phone platform to a wide range of companies and services. One of the most
2 An authentication mechanism that enables individual users to authenticate each
other during a chat session without involving the respective chat servers.
prominent services provided by diﬀerent applications on smartphones is mobile
chat. It provides a potentially convenient and cost-eﬀective alternative to tradi-
tional voice and SMS3. Mobile chat services have the potential to eclipse SMS
communication and this trend is becoming more obvious on a daily basis[1].
With consumers' increasing reliance on mobile chat services, security and pri-
vacy features are becoming serious concerns [8,9].
Consumers use a mobile chat service to communicate with each other, a
process that can include relaying personal information. The security and privacy
of such communications should be taken seriously. However, recent episodes of
vulnerability in the major chat services (i.e. WhatsApp [10]) reveal that they
might not be robustly implementing security and privacy features.
In the following sections, we brieﬂy explore the range of mobile chat ap-
plications available on Android and iOS. This discussion provides an analysis
of existing work in the commercial arena. In section 2.6, we discuss existing
academic work related to security and privacy-preserving chat software. The
selection of commercially available chat software was made in a manner that
reﬂects the existing approaches, and it is by no means an exhaustive list.
2.2 WhatsApp
WhatsApp is considered to be one of the biggest mobile chat services available
on diﬀerent platforms (e.g. iOS, and Android). The architecture of the service is
proprietary and the details in this section are taken from a range of resources;
notably from [11]. The main focus of the product is on messaging and privacy
concerns are secondary. WhatsApp does not store any messages on the server:
the chat history is stored on the client's device. The client application uses SSL
[12] to connect to the server; however, a recent blog posting [10] discussed the
deployment of SSL version 2. This deployment might open up WhatsApp to
attacks on SSL 2.0. There is no E2E encryption to provide security in chat
messages between sender and receiver. Therefore, the message server can read
the messages exchanged.
2.3 BlackBerry Messenger
BlackBerry Messenger (BBM), for better or worse, is perceived to be a secure
messaging service. In this section, we examine the consumer version of the BBM,
not the business application. An analysis conducted by Communications Security
Establishment Canada (CSEC) in 2011 found a number of issues with the BBM
[13]. Messages are encrypted but the cryptographic key used is a global key
that is common to every BlackBerry device/application. The use of a single key
to encrypt all messages sent using BBM enables the message server to decrypt
3 Smartphone-based mobile chat services use the Internet as the communication
medium, and this might be provided by a Telecom operator. In some areas the
cost for mobile data might reduce its beneﬁts in comparison to traditional Telecom
services.
the messages. In addition, there is a potential for malicious users to gain access
to the global key and decrypt any intercepted messages sent or received via
BBM.
2.4 Wickr
The most recent addition to the range of secure chat applications is Wickr.
Although most of their architecture is proprietary, in this section we discuss the
features they claim to oﬀer4. They claim that they encrypt individual messages
using a cryptographic key. However, it is diﬃcult to determine whether these keys
are generated by the message server or the clients. They only claim that users'
private keys are not communicated to the server. Furthermore, it is claimed that
device, location and Meta information about users and messages is protected,
providing a strong privacy mechanism. Communication between the device and
the message server is protected by TLS [14].
2.5 Silent Text
Similar to mobile chat applications discussed above, the complete architectural
design of Silent Text is proprietary. There is fragmentary information available
on their website5. Silent Text enables E2E key exchange and secure message
communication using the Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol (SCIMP) [15].
Each message is encrypted with a new key that is expanded/derived from a
master secret shared between the communicating entities. The message server
does not handle any key material and does not store any messages. To share
the master secret, the communicating entities have to exchange several messages
(before they can actually communicate). It is not clear from their white paper [15]
and website whether their key sharing protocol supports oine communication6.
2.6 Related Work
Security and privacy issues in relation to smart phones have received consid-
erable attention [16,17,18] with regard to mobile chat applications. Although
there are a number of mobile chat applications that claim to provide a secure
service, their complete architecture is not publicly available. To our best knowl-
edge there are not many publications that describe such systems. Secure text
messaging systems have a strong foundation in proposals like Media Path Key
Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP (ZRTP) [19], Oﬀ-the-Record (OTR) [20] and
A Secure Text Messaging Protocol [21]. In this paper, we aim to present a po-
tential architecture along with security and privacy-preserving architecture to
provide a complete architecture, thereby ﬁlling the gap in the existing work in
the area of mobile chat applications.
4 Claims were made on their website https://www.mywickr.com/en/howitworks.php
5 Silent text website https://silentcircle.com/web/silent-text/
6 Oine Communication: In mobile chat applications, a user can send messages to
other users even when they are not online, using so-called oine communication.
3 Secure and Privacy Preserving Mobile Chat
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the security and privacy requirements of mobile
chat applications. In the remaining part of this section, we detail a proposed
architecture and describe its features.
3.1 Secure and Privacy Preserving Mobile Chat Requirements
Before we present the details of the proposed architecture for mobile chat appli-
cations, this section provides a brief list of requirements that any such proposal
should meet:
Req1 The sign-up process should require minimal information related to the
user. The account creation process should not rely heavily on Personal
Identity Information (PII)
Req2 The key exchange process should be secure, seamless and support oﬀ-line
chat
Req3 Encryption/decryption of messages should not require user interaction
(i.e. least interaction)
Req4 Secure oine messages can be communicated securely along with poten-
tial key share
Req5 Individual users have a mechanism to authenticate each other, assuring
themselves they are communicating with the right person
Req6 Communications are not stored on the chat server. Individual chat ses-
sions can be stored on the user's device
Req7 Local chat storage should be adequately protected
Req8 To safeguard the privacy of the users and their chat, the message-server
should not be able to retrieve the messages.
3.2 Proposed Architecture
The generic architecture of a secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat applica-
tion is shown in Figure 1.
After downloading a mobile chat application, the user of mobile `A' initiates
the sign-up process. The sign-up process is used either to create a new account
or to sign in using an existing account (credentials). The chat server, which
consists of a membership server and a message server, initiates the account
creation process. The membership server manages the user's accounts, associated
credentials and (optionally) the user's contact-list. The message server handles
the message communication between users, whether both users are online or if
the intended recipient is oine. If the recipient is oine, the message will be
stored in the oine message store. These messages are temporarily stored and
once they are delivered to the respective recipients they are deleted. The dotted
line represents virtual communication between the users of mobiles `A' and `B',
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Fig. 1. Generic Architecture of a Mobile Chat Application
The communication link between the mobile application and the message
server is protected using cryptography. In addition, the virtual communication
link between the users of mobiles `A' and `B' is encrypted using the cryptographic
keys generated and known only to the respective applications (of users `A' and
`B').
The generic architecture shown in Figure 1 is essentially deployed by all of
the mobile chat services discussed in section 2. However, the diﬀerentiator is the
features deployed by the proposed architecture that are discussed in subsequent
sections.
3.3 Signing Up
When a user completes the installation of an application and wants to create a
new account or connect using existing credentials, they can initiate the sign-up
process described below:
1. User selects either the new account option or an existing account.
(a) If the user is an existing customer, then she will provide her account
credentials (login/password)
(b) If the user is a new customer, she will provide her email address7 and
provides a password (for mobile applications)
2. The server checks the provided information from the previous step, and in-
structs the application to generate local credentials. In addition, the server
also generates a unique alphanumeric sequence that acts as the user identi-
ﬁer.
3. The mobile application generates a set of keys
7 Email veriﬁcation is carried out as part of the account creation process, in which an
account only becomes active after the user clicks the account activation link sent to
her (provided) email address.
(a) A signature key pair for TLS [14]
(b) A public key pair for encryption/decryption operations
(c) A symmetric storage key to encrypt/decrypt local storage that includes
contact list, chat history and key store.
4. On the mobile application's request and veriﬁcation by the chat server, it
issues cryptographic certiﬁcates to both the signature key and the public key
of the application
In subsequent communications between the mobile chat application and the
chat server, a unique alphanumeric user ID and cryptographic certiﬁcate is used
to authenticate the user/application and establish a TLS session (i.e. a two-way
authentication-based SSL/TLS session). To add users to contact lists, their email
address or unique identities can be used. When user `A' makes a request to add
user `B' and she accepts the request, both users will then share their public keys
along with associated certiﬁcates (issued by the chat server). The certiﬁcates
provide the necessary guarantee that the received public key indeed belongs to
the appropriate user.
3.4 Key Exchange
Keeping in mind the requirements listed in section 3.1, we have to design a key
exchange process that can work even when the intended recipient(s) are oine.
The requirement for an oine key exchange rules out any synchronous two-way
key sharing protocols. The rationale behind having an oine key exchange is
to avoid restricting a user to communicating only if a key is already shared. In
addition, sharing a key only when both parties are online might not be a feasible
proposition. Furthermore, in group chats all users would have to be online to
share the key before they could start secure communication with each other. In
this situation, if a single participant is oine then either she might not be able
to read messages exchanged in the group chat or she has to be removed from
the group if the chat session has to be established/continued.
Master (Symmetric) KeyCryptographic AlgoKey LifetimeTimestamp Four Random Numbers
Fig. 2. Key Share Message Structure
Therefore, we propose a scheme for key sharing that can accommodate such
requirements. Each communicating party will generate a random key and encrypt
it using the public key of the intended recipient. The encrypted message contains
a number of elements shown in Figure 2. Timestamps [22] are included to avoid
any potential replay attacks. Clock synchronisation between the communicating
entities (users) is not required to use the timestamp, because when a mobile
application connects to the chat server, it gets a time (server time) and uses it
as an internal application. The timestamp included in the message is taken from
this internal application time and not from the device/user time. All applications
will get their internal time synchronised with the chat server whenever they
connect with it, thus removing the need to synchronise device clocks between
users.
The key lifetime ﬁeld gives a choice to the user/mobile-application to set
a limit on key usage. The key lifetime ﬁeld can conﬁgured to a session-based
lifetime or to any arbitrary time (e.g. seven days). The cryptographic algo ﬁeld
communicates the preferred symmetric key algorithm that the sender would like
the receiver to use when communicating with her. The cryptographic algorithms
are chosen from a list of selected algorithms which are part of the mobile chat
application. The four random numbers included in the message are to generate
individual message keys that are discussed in detail in section 3.6. Finally, the
last block contains the master key (symmetric key) that the sender requires the
receiver to use during any future communications.
Mobile A Mobile B
Encrypt with B’s Public Key(Timestamp, key lifetime, 
cryptographic algo, four random numbers, A’ master key)
Encrypt with A’s Public Key(Timestamp, key lifetime, 
cryptographic algo, four random numbers, A’ master key)
Fig. 3. Key Exchange Two Users
A point to note is that the key and cryptographic-algorithm choice shared
by the sender communicates to the receiver that when decrypting any future
messages from this sender, she should use them, as shown in Figure 3. Similarly,
the receiver will also send the key share message shown in Figure 2 encrypted by
the sender's public key. Therefore, both users will use their own generated keys
to encrypt all their outgoing messages. The only diﬀerence in a group chat is
that the chat organiser (group creator/administrator) will generate the master
key and share it with all participants, who will then use this key to encrypt all
their messages. This avoids using multiple keys (equal to the number of users in
the group) to communicate with all users in the group.
3.5 Mutual User-to-User (U2U) Authentication
Mobile chat authenticates itself to the chat server, but U2U authentication is
between the users themselves. This authentication process does not involve the
chat server and the objective of the process is to assure communicating entities
that they are talking with the right person. The U2U authentication process has
two phases: the opt-in and the authentication phase.
In the opt-in phase, users agree on establishing a U2U authentication mech-
anism. To accomplish this, two users will initiate the U2U opt-in phase shown
Mobile A Mobile BUser A User B
Request Opt-In
Request U2U Authentication Establishment
Request Opt-In
Initiate U2U Authentication Establishment 
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Fig. 4. Overview Of the U2U Authentication
in Figure 4. The numeric items in the ﬁgure 4 relate to the process steps listed
below:
1. User A requests establishment of a U2U authentication mechanism with user
B. The request is communicated to user B : if she accepts the establishment
of U2U authentication, her decision is communicated back to user A
2. Both users A and B provide their secrets (keyword) to their respective mo-
bile chat applications that will generate hash values of the secrets. Chat
applications communicate these hash values to each other.
3. In this step, the mobile applications of A and B generate U2U secrets (in-
dividually). The mobile application of A will generate its U2U secret by
hashing the concatenation of the secret of A and the hash of B 's secret. Sim-
ilarly, the mobile application of B will generate its U2U secret by hashing
the concatenation of the secret of B and the hash of A's secret. This means
that both mobile chat applications have diﬀerent U2U authentication values
4. Either of the users can request U2U authentication; however in ﬁgure 4, A
initiates the authentication phase
5. Both A and B provide their secrets to their respective mobile chat applica-
tions
6. Individual applications will have these secrets and communicate them to
each other
7. Applications will then generate the U2U secret and match with the stored
value. If it matches then they can ascertain that the person with whom they
are chatting is not an imposter
A point to note is that all the messages listed in Figure 4 are communi-
cated conﬁdentially, using the shared cryptographic keys. These messages are
encrypted as if they were chat messages, which are discussed in detail in the
next section. A point to note is that our mechanism is not comparable to the
SafeSlinger8 as the U2U authentication is no associated in any way with the key
generation.
3.6 Message Communication
In this section, we discuss how individual messages are constructed and how the
shared master key is used to generate message keys. The keys are then used
to encrypt and decrypt the messages. Each message send by individual users is
encrypted by a diﬀerent key, generated using the shared master key and four
random numbers (ﬁgure 2).
To generate individual message keys, we use the Pseudorandom Number
Generator (PRNG) design from [23], illustrated in Figure 5. The shared (four)
random numbers are taken as the seed ﬁle: for each iteration a random number
(n) is encrypted using the shared master key. The output is used as the message
key. The output is again encrypted using the shared master key, the output is
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Fig. 5. Message Key Generation [23]
The message generated will then be used to encrypt the outgoing message.
Similarly, each user will also have a second message key generator for messages
they are receiving. For incoming and outgoing messages, each communicating en-
tity will have two diﬀerent shared master keys and seed ﬁles. Therefore, message
keys for outgoing and incoming messages will be diﬀerent.
3.7 Chat and Proﬁle Storage
All data related to the application should be securely stored on the device. As
chat histories are not stored on the server, users might need to have them on their
devices. Therefore, chat histories, shared master keys, public key pairs, signature
key pairs and contact lists should be stored on the device, protected with the
user's Personal Identiﬁcation Number (PIN) or password. For our proposal, we
use a PIN-based mechanism with a short velocity limit (only three wrong tries
8 Website: https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger/
permitted). If a user locks her applications, she can delete the application and
then reinstall it again. If she provides her account credentials she can get her
contact list back, but her application will generate new public and signature key
pairs (revoking previous keys) along with establishing new master shared keys
with her contacts.
In our proposal, the PIN is not the account credential that the user requires
to connect with the chat server. The PIN is to authenticate the user to her
mobile chat application and open her proﬁle. The PIN is not communicated by
the mobile chat application to the chat server and it is stored locally. To protect
the PIN value, the application has to rely on the underlying platform and its
security mechanism, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Practical Implementation
Using the proposed architecture/features of the mobile chat application in the
previous section, we detail the basic implementation carried out to provide a
proof-of-concept for the proposed architecture. In this section, we discuss the
practical implementation.
4.1 Technology Overview
As part of the design, we opted for using components that are publicly available
and have the least license restrictions. For this reason, most of the features
presented in the proposal are built using public libraries.
As shown in Figure 1, the deployment of a secure chat service requires the
implementation of the chat server and the mobile application. For mobile ap-
plication development, we choose the Android platform [24]. The chat server
was hosted on the Intel9 Core i7, 2.70 GHz and 8GB RAM machine running
Ubuntu10 13.10.
In subsequent sections, we brieﬂy discuss the implementation experience for
both the chat server and the mobile application.
4.2 Server Side Implementation
On the chat server, we deployed two logical servers. One server ran XAMPP 1.8.3
as a membership server and Mosquitto 1.2.3 as a message server. The XAMPP
server is an Apache [25] distribution containing MySQL [26], PHP [27], and
Perl [28]. In addition to this, we also included Mcrypt [29] and OpenSSL [30]
extensions.
Mosquitto [31] is an open source message server based on the MQ Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) protocol [32]. The most recent release of Mosquitto sup-
ports the MQTT protocol version 3.1, which provides a very lightweight mes-
saging architecture. We chose Mosquitto for its implementation of MQTT and
the rationale behind the choice of MQTT is:
9 Intel website: www.intel.com
10 Ubuntu website: www.ubuntu.com
MQTT provided several useful features, such as push notiﬁcations (so that
constant polling for new messages is not required by the Android-based chat
application), assured message delivery and reliability, low battery usage, and
also oine message delivery. Oine messages are stored on the message server
until the recipient comes online, at which point these messages are sent to the
recipient and removed from the server.
MQTT also provides smaller message sizes due to being a binary protocol,
compared to other protocols like XMPP [33], which uses XML [34] for its mes-
sages. Using MQTT means that text messages are smaller in size than the same
messages created with other message protocols such as XMPP (an example is the
two character message :), which using MQTT generates 70 bytes, whereas the
same message in XMPP is represented with 100 bytes). The low data usage for
communicating the message is important from the point of view of both perfor-
mance (delivery of messages) and bandwidth usage (i.e. mobile data packages).
Fig. 6. Screen Shot of Mobile Chat Application Running on Two Android Devices
4.3 Mobile Side Implementation
For mobile chat, we developed an application supporting Android 4.1+. Ad-
ditional APIs included GSON [35] for converting JSON, SQLCipher [36] for
fully encrypted databases, Eclipse Paho [37] for MQTT messaging and Spongy
Castle11 [39] for cryptographic algorithms. The PIN is stored in the applica-
tion/share preferences, and it unlocks the SQLCipher encryption/decryption key.
11 Repackage of Bouncy Castle [38] for Android
Shared master keys, (optional) chat histories, U2U authentication secrets, and
contact lists are stored in the SQLCipher database.
5 Overall Analysis
In section, we brieﬂy analyse the architecture and implementation of our secure
mobile chat service.
5.1 Analysis of the Proposed Architecture
In section 3.1, we list12 seven basic requirements for a secure and privacy pre-
serving chat service. Taking these seven requirements, we have provided a com-
parison between our proposal and commercially available products discussed in
section 2. The comparison based on the listed requirements is shown in table 1.
Table 1. Comparison with Existing Chat Applications
Criteria WhatsApp BlackBerry Messenger Wickr Silent Text Proposed Chat
Req1 - ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Req2 - - (∗) (∗) ∗
Req3 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Req4 - - - - ∗
Req5 - - - - ∗
Req6 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Req7 - ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Note: ∗ means that it meets the requirement. - stands for either does not support
the requirement or information is not publicly available. (∗) means that the
requirement is partially supported.
It is clear that our proposal meets all the requirements, and that one of
the most widely-used mobile chat services, WhatsApp does not satisfy even
half of the requirements. However, in support of WhatsApp we can argue that
they do not market or claim to provide a secure and privacy-preserving chat
service. Therefore, it is only natural that it does not meet the majority of the
requirements.
5.2 Implementation Analysis
The objective of the implementation was to provide a proof-of-concept for con-
structing a secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat application with publicly
available speciﬁcations. Therefore, this exercise was a study of the technical dif-
ﬁculties that a chat service provider might face in developing such a service.
12 * We do not claim that this is an exhaustive list and it should be considered as a
basic list of requirements.
During our development process, we did not face any technical issues. In most
cases, the important components required for such a proposed service are already
present, apart from concerns about handling a large number of simultaneous con-
nections.
We only tested the application for its features and whether it adequately
supports the listed requirements (section 3.1). In addition, we did not test the
scalability of the implementation of the chat server. However, with regard to
message generation, the implementation was comparable to any commercially
available mobile chat application. However, we cannot claim the same for the
chat server as we did not simulate the load test to make it comparable to other
mobile chat services. Such a test is beyond the scope of this work.
6 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In this paper, we provided an open speciﬁcation for a secure and privacy-
preserving chat service. We described the basic requirements, architecture and
implementation experience in deploying such a service. The aim of the paper is
to develop mobile chat services and explore any potential complexities involved
in such a service providing privacy protection to its customers. In this work,
we explored the theoretical foundations and technical challenges faced if privacy
protection is built into a chat service. We found that most of the theoretical and
technical components are already available. With a few minor modiﬁcations, a
strongly privacy-based chat service can be constructed. We have shown that
a secure and privacy-preserving chat application is technically feasible. During
the implementation of the framework, we did not face any serious issues con-
cerning the technology or performance that might make this proposal infeasible.
Whether it is a viable business is a diﬀerent aspect of such a service, and was
not considered in this paper.
In future research, we would like to experiment with the scalability and per-
formance of the chat server: this might reveal some bottlenecks in building and
maintaining a privacy-based chat server. Another potential aspect is investiga-
tion of how the text chat service proposed in this paper could be extended to a
voice and video chat service. The challenges presented in providing a secure and
privacy-preserving voice and/or video chat service might be more than those pre-
sented by a text-based chat service. This will give a much better insight into the
development of secure and privacy-preserving services, their running costs and
usability requirements, providing an opportunity to understand the underlying
reasons why such services are not prevalent or widely adopted by customers.
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